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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HUGH

J. HATCH and ARDEAN HATCH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.

vs.

8644
STEPHEN ADAMS, SARAH ADAMS and
EARL ADAMS,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING, AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellants, Hugh J. Hatch and Ardean Hatch, petition
the Court for a rehearing in this case upon the grounds hereinafter set forth.
In support of said Petition, appellants rely upon the following points:
3
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POINT I
THE WORD "APPURTENANT" IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CERTAIN IN MEANING THAT THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES CAN BE ASCERTAINED BY ITS USAGE,
AND THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOTREMANDING THE CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DIRECTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE
TO DETERMINE WHAT WATER THE PARTIES INTENDED TO TRANSFER WHEN THEY USED THE TERM
"APPURTENANT WATER" IN THE CONTRACT.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DECISION
OR FINDING BASED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS
TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IT WAS
ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO INCLUDE SUCH EVIDENCE IN ITS DECISION AND TO PASS UPON THE
QUESTION OF INTENT.

POINT III
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT INCORRECTLY
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSUMPTION THAT
THE QUESTION OF APPURTENANCY WAS THE SOLE
ISSUE IN THE ACTION WHEREAS THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE DETERMINING ISSUE.
4
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WHEREFORE, appellants pray that their petition for
rehearing be granted and that upon such rehearing, and after
consideration of the record, and the law, the decision of the
Court be recalled, and the case remanded to the trial court
for trial.
RALPH & BUSHNELL
By Elwood A. Crandall
Attorneys for Appellants
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE WORD "APPURTENANT" IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CERTAIN IN MEANING THAT THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES CAN BE ASCERTAINED BY ITS USAGE,
AND THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOTREMANDING THE CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DIRECTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE
TO DETERMINE WHAT WATER THE PARTIES INTENDED TO TRANSFER WHEN THEY USED THE TERM
"APPURTENANT WATER" IN THE CONTRACT.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DECISION
OR FINDING BASED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS
TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IT WAS
ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO INCLUDE SUCH EVIDENCE IN ITS DECISION AND TO PASS UPON THE
QUESTION OF INTENT.
5
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POINT III
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT INCORRECTLY
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSUMPTION THAT
THE QUESTION OF APPURTENANCY WAS THE SOLE
ISSUE IN THE ACTION WHEREAS THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE DETERMINING ISSUE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WORD "APPURTENANT" IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CERTAIN IN MEANING THAT THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES CAN BE ASCERTAINED BY ITS USAGE,
AND THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOTREMANDING THE CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DIRECTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE
TO DETERMINE WHAT WATER THE PARTIES INTENDED TO TRANSFER WHEN THEY USED THE TERM
"APPURTENANT WATER" IN THE CONTRACT.
Inasmuch as the contract which transferred the farm land
from the respondents to the appellants indicated that the land
would be transferred with all water rights appurtenant thereto,
and inasmuch as no further mention was made in the contract
of the exact water that was considered by the parties to be
appurtenant, the appellants attempted to introduce evidence
in the trial to show what was meant by the terms (T-4, 5).
This evidence was not introduced to vary the terms of the contract, but to explain them. Counsel for the respondents objected
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to the introduction of the proffered evidence on the ground
that it was within the parol evidence rule, and the trial court,
in its minute entry, sustained the defendant's objection on the
ground that the evidence violated the parol evidence rule and
that the contract was not ambiguous (R. 31.) In so doing the
trial court committed prejudical error, and this error was not
recognized in the decisoin of this court. Such holdings are
error for the reason that the evidence offered did not vary the
instrument but rather explained it, and therefore was not in
violation of the parol evidence rule.
The following is the universal rule:
The parol evidence rule does not preclude the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence for the purpose
of aiding in the interpretation or construction of a written instrument where the language of the instrument
itself, taken alone, is such that it does not clearly express the intention of the parties or the subject of the
agreement. Such evidence is admitted not to add or to
detract from the writing but merely to ascertain what
the meaning of the parties is . . . 32 C.J.S. Evidence
Sec. 959. (Italics added.)
The word "appurtenant" is not certain in its meaning.
Even the courts have applied interpretations to the word which
vary from meaning only those things indispensable to the use

of land (Ogden v. Jones, 37 S.W. 2nd 777) to simply those
things which serve some useful purpose to the land (Nixon
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 14 Ohio App. 472). If
the courts are undecided as to the exact meaning of the word,
can it be expected that the true intent of laymen can be determined if the word alone is the only evidence of their intention?
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The following quotation from McCormick on Evidence,
Sec. 217, throws light on this somewhat hazy area of the law:
(See authority cited thereafter in the treatise.)
... written instruments are not self-sufficient and
automatic mandates which the courts can always enforce
merely by inspecting the instrument and stamping it
with a judicial fiat. Written words can be translated
into appropriate action by the court only through the
process of ascertaining what the words stand for in
the way of particular conduct or particular tangible
objects. This process of interpretation is one which
every human expression is subjected to wherever it is
sought later to be used by human beings as a measure
of conduct . . . this process is often unnoticed and frequently simple, but often again the meaning of the
writing is a contested question between the parties,
and evidence is adduced to solve the issue. The distinction between such interpretative evidence even where
it consists of expressions of the parties to the instrument, and evidence of such expressions when offered
to be used as a part of the contract, deed or otlier transaction, and hence prohibited by the Parol Evidence
Rule, is clear. The one type of evidence concedes the
supremacy of the writing and merely seeks to illuminate its meaning. Evidence of the prior statements,
negotiations, and agreements of the parties, offered
strictly for the purpose of interpretation, may be excluded under (other) restt·ictions . . . , but such evidence is not within the prohibition of the Parol Et'idence Rule. (Italics added.)
The admission of parol evidence for the purpose of establishing what were the circumstances under which the contract
was made, what was the relation of the parties, and what was
their mutual knowledge, is not an infringement of the rule
that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict, add to, or
8
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vary a contract in writing. Olsson v. Nelson, 248 Ala. 28 So.
2nd 186.
Where language of a contract is uncertain, extrinsic evidence as to circumstances which preceded and surrounded the
execution of the contract is admissible and when such evidence
has been received, the question of the meaning of the language
used is one of fact. Silva v. Meyer, 276 P 2nd 174, see also
Cordas v. Wright, 277 P 2nd 520.
The intention of the parties control
of deeds. 16 Am. Jur. 527.

111

the construction

That the intention of the grantor governs in conveyances
transferring appurtenant water is clear. In the case of James
v. Barker et al, Colo., 1937, 64 P 2nd 598, where an almost
identical fact situation existed, a deed purported to convey
some water rights with the usual "together with all and singular
the privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging'' clause,
the court held:
A water right used, as here, for the irrigation of land,
will pass under the appurtenance clause in a conveyance of land, without a specific mention in the deed, if
the presumptions arising from the circumstances of
the transaction make it appear that it was the intention
of the grantor that it should so pass.
In order to determine the circumstances of the transaction
and the intention of the grantor, it is necessary to introduce
evidence of the exact nature as that which the appellants
attempted to introduce in the trial court. The decision of this
court should remand the action for a new trial with instructions
to admit extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties.

9
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DECISION
OR FINDING BASED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS
TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IT WAS
ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO INCLUDE SUCH EVIDENCE IN ITS DECISION AND TO PASS UPON THE
QUESTION OF INTENT.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike
parol evidence offered to corroborate and explain the intent
of the parties as shown by the contract. Inconsistently thereafter
the court then proceeded to make Findings of Fact as to
whether the water was appurtenant and the intent of the parties.
In so doing, it relied upon extrinsic and parol evidence which
it had purportedly stricken from the record. The Supreme Court
in affirming the judgment of the trial court has made the same
error. It has by implication upheld the ruling of the trial
court in striking the parol evidence. Then it proceeds to examine
the evidence in support of the trial court's determination and
concludes "There can be no doubt that there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court's findings." It is the position
of the appellants that the lower court, having stricken the parol
evidence, ruled as a matter of law that the water did not pass
pursuant to the contract as being appurtenant to the land since
the water rights were represented by stock certificates. Reliance
thereafter by the trial court and by the Supreme Court on parol
evidence introduced by the defendants, more particularly, the
escrow agreement and the letter to Mr. Adams, cannot be
consistently explained. All the plaintiffs request from this court
is a ruling to the effect that parol and extrinsic evidence may
10
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be received to determine the intent of the parties and that a
new trial be granted, at which time all of such evidence will
be considered by the trier of the facts.
The decision cited parol evidence m the favor of the
respondents to indicate the intent of the parties when in the
trial court, as the fact finder, lies the sole determination of the
issue of intent.
The trial court did not make a finding as to the intent of
the parties, and therefore, that issue is not before the appellate
court. By affirming the trial court this court must adhere to
the view that extrinsic evidence as to intent is inadmissible.
It was improper therefore to assume the position and at the
same time cite such evidence in the opinion.
It is true that such evidence as cited was admitted in the
trial court without objection from the appellants, but the appellants, in order to remain consistent with their view of the
law, could not object to such evidence and at the same time
allege that all such extrinsic evidence was admissible to clarify
the intent of the contracting parties. This dilemma should not
be used against the appellants in derogation of their rights.
It is submitted that the escrow agreement and the letter which
were referred to in the decision should stand in the same light
as evidence which the appellants attempted unsuccessfully to
introduce. All such evidence should be placed before the trial
court for a decision of fact, but no part of this type of evidence
should be considered by either the trial or appellate court
without considering all like evidence.

11
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POINT III
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT INCORRECTLY
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSUMPTION THAT
THE QUESTION OF APPURTENANCY WAS THE SOLE
ISSUE IN THE ACTION WHEREAS THE INTENT OF
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE DETERMINING ISSUE.
According to the respondents the sole purpose of this
action was to determine whether the water represented by the
stock in question was appurtenant to the land which was sold
under the contract. Quoting from their brief at page 2:
It should be remembered that the case went to trial
on this one issue only. This is not a case brought to
reform a contract. Nor is it a case brought upon a
theory of fraud or mistake in reducing the agreement
to writing.
Though we agree that the issues were not couched in terms
of reformation, fraud or mistake, we cannot agree that the sole
question presented by the pleadings was the question of appurtenancy. Rather, the issue before the trial court was what
effect should be given the contract of the parties. Paragraph 4
of the appellant's complaint reads as follows:
4. The Plaintiffs are entitled by the terms of the above
mentioned contract to have transferred to them the
water rights represented by said certificates.

Throughout this action, the appellants have based their rights
on the contractual intent of the parties as evidenced by the
written instrument and as clarified by extrinsic evidence.
12
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In its decision this Court, in construing Brimm v. Cache
Valley Banking Company, 2 U 2nd 93, 269 P 2nd 859, held
that for water represented by stock to pass in a conveyance,
it must be found first that the water was in fact appurtenant to
the land, and second, that it was the intent of the grantor to
transfer the water with the land.
The decision states: "There was substantial conflict in the
evidence as to the extent and use of the water on this land.''
It is submitted that there was no conflict in the evidence in
this regard. Rather, the water had been used in connection
with this farm for almost one-half century. There was no contention by any parties but what the water was purchased with
the farm by the respondents and used by them on the farm until
the time of sale, and thereafter was used by the appellants
for approximately two years before this dispute arose. The
case was not tried on the question of whether the water was
appurtenant but rather, whether it had been included in the
contract.
We respectfully submit that water rights in the State of
Utah are transferred almost daily by the passing of shares of
stock when the water is not appurtenant to any land and in
fact when a transfer of real estate is not part of the same exchange. In effect this decision of the court holds that, since the
Brimm case, in order for there to be a valid transfer of water
rights, the grantor must not only intend to transfer the water,
but also the water must be appurtenant to the land. It is the
view of the appellants that even if the water in question was
not appurtenant it may be transferred if such was the intent
of the parties.

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In this case a specific mention of water rights was made
in the contract. The Brimm case dealt with a situation where
no mention of water was made in the deed. Where there is
no mention of water rights in the document of transfer, in
order for the water rights to pass with the land it is necessary
to find that it is appurtenant. This doctrine is based upon the
proposition that where water rights are so completely identified
with certain property, they are deemed to be an incident of
that property and will pass without specific mention in the
deed. The Brimm case had one other requirement. In addition
to being appurtenant, if the water rights are represented by
stock certificates, then it must be shown that it was the intent
of the parties that these rights should also pass with the land.
So even under the Brimm case, the matter of intent was important and was emphasized by the court. Since the word
"appurtenant" has no uniform technical meaning, it therefore
becomes necessary to look at all of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of the parties.
In "In re Johnson's Estate," 64 Utah 114, 728 Pacific, the court
stated:

.

In such a case (where water rights are separated
from the land) if the water right is represented by
shares of stock in a corporation, the plain implication
is that it may be transferred by a transfer of the certificate of stock, in the ordinafy manne1', as personal
property. But that does not necessarily mean that water
rights thus represented may not be an appurtenant to
the land upon which the water is used, and pass as such
with a conveyance of the land. (Italics added.)
It is the contention of the appellants that even if the water
in question was not appurtenant in the strict sense of the word,
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the appellants should be allowed their right to prove, if they
can, that by using the word "appurtenant" it was the intent
of the parties to the contract to include the water in question
in the conveyance, and that upon establishing this the water
would be transferred. The case should be remanded for a new
trial for a determination of this issue which was not made by
the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The Brimm case holds that where water rights are represented by stock certificates, a rebuttable presumption is created.
The transferee, to rebut the presumption created by statute,
may introduce evidence to show that the water was in fact
appurtenant and that the parties intended that the water rights
were to be included as an incident of the property. If extrinsic
and parol evidence is not permitted, how then may the presumption be rebutted?
In this case the decision as written holds that where the
transferee acquired the property pursuant to a contract, which
stated "all water rights appurtenant thereto" may not introduce
extrinsic or parol evidence to show what was meant by the
word "appurtenant" or the intent of the parties. Such a holding
places the transferee in a worse position by reason of having
such a statement in the contract that he would have been if
he had only received a deed of conveyance. To be consistent,
parol and extrinsic evidence should be admissible to show
that the water was in fact appurtenant and the intent of the
parites in either case. The statement in the contract is merely
evidence concerning the intent of the parties and should not
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be used to prohibit introduction of evidence on the two issues
mentioned above. For these reasons the case should be remanded
to the trial court for a new trial to determine the rights of the
parties after due consideration of all the facts surrounding the
transaction.
Respectfully submitted,

RALPH & BUSHNELL
By Elwood A. Crandall

Attorneys for Appellants
15 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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